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Past spending over-runs have left Canadian governments more vulnerable to
the budgetary impacts of the financial crisis, underlining the need for more
careful revenue projections, tighter spending scrutiny and better oversight by
legislators. The public should expect no less.
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T
he explosion of government
spending and borrowing around
the world that followed the
2008/2009 financial crisis and slump has
prompted concerns about unsustainable
fiscal policy. So far, the fears of default that
have begun to rattle investors in sovereign
debt elsewhere have not affected Canada.
However, the ability of federal and provincial/
territorial governments to plan sensibly and deliver
on their promises will come under sharper scrutiny.
In this Backgrounder we look at each jurisdiction’s
performance over the past decade, evaluate
governments’ fiscal  situations in the light of that
record, and suggest areas for improvement.1
The annual fiscal cycles of Canadian governments
have two major events – the tabling of budget plans,
and the tabling of the public accounts. The budget
plan, usually delivered around the beginning of the
fiscal year,2is the key planning document for financial
management. The public accounts, normally released
about eight months after the fiscal year-end, provide
the official, audited statement of financial results.
The extent to which the public accounts reveal
adherence to, or deviation from, budget plans should
be a major focus of attention by legislators and the
public. If legislators do not hold governments to
account for deviations between budget projections
and actual results, a key link in the chain of
accountability to voters is missing. Yet governments’
records on these matters receive only casual attention
– a gap our measures are intended to help fill. 
To prefigure the main results, spending overruns
and missed revenue targets are a common occurrence
in Canada. Countrywide, spending overruns over
the past decade exceeded $70 billion, limiting 
debt reduction and tax relief in earlier years, and
materially adding to current deficits. Some
jurisdictions, however, do better than others.
Quebec’s record in hitting budget targets is good;
those of Alberta and Saskatchewan are less so. 
We also find considerable variation in the financial
reporting of Canadian governments. Although the
correlation is imprecise, the jurisdictions that hit their
budget targets more accurately tend to be those where
budgetary and public accounts presentations are clear
and easily comparable, the public accounts are tabled
in a timely way, and audits are relatively clean.
For governments seeking to reassure voters of their
capacities to restore budget balance and long-term
fiscal sustainability, better reporting and improved
oversight to achieve stricter adherence to budget
targets should be a priority. 
Calculating Budget Over and Undershoots
Our starting point for this investigation is a
straightforward proposition: concerned citizens and
conscientious legislators should, without undue
effort, be able to find the critical numbers for
revenue, spending, and the bottom line in budget
and year-end documents. Accordingly, the data we
use are those that are earliest and most prominently
displayed in budget documents and in Volume I of
the public accounts.3
We compare projections to outcomes for both
revenues and expenditures in percentage terms.
Ideally, we would compare levels – dollar amounts.
In some cases, however, especially in the earlier years,
differences in accounting in budget and public
accounts documents make these comparisons
misleading. To reduce potential distortions that
would arise from level-to-level comparisons, we
compare changes from the previous year as shown in
the respective documents. We divide the year-to-year
changes by the budgeted amounts to get percentages
that facilitate cross-government comparisons. 
Independent • Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
We thank Mathieu Laberge, John G. Williams, and a number of anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft. We take sole
responsibility for any errors and for our conclusions.
1 See Adrian et al. (2007) and Busby and Robson (2008, 2009) for earlier years’ results. 
2 The federal, provincial and territorial governments’ fiscal years run from April 1 to March 31.
3 In the case of  territorial public accounts not yet published, we use figures from the federal Department of Finance’s fiscal reference tables for
the most recent year. We deviate from our rule that we compare the most prominent summary numbers in budgets and public accounts in the
case of Newfoundland and Labrador. That province uses a different accounting basis for the two sets of figures. Its public accounts, however,
provide an additional report on the same accounting basis as the budget, and our judgement is that the additional report is prominently
enough displayed to warrant using for the comparison.| 2 Backgrounder 129
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Announced Spending Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1999/00 0.1 -1.0 -0.3 4.6 2.1 -1.2 2.9 1.8 -0.3 2.2 1.3 -3.6
2000/01 0.6 3.1 1.5 -0.6 -2.3 2.8 -1.2 -0.6 3.6 1.8 -1.3 4.8 -1.9 3.2
2001/02 5.1 5.4 -0.2 0.5 6.6 3.4 2.2 1.7 5.8 12.5 7.4 4.5 -1.1 1.8
2002/03 3.3 1.5 1.3 0.9 4.4 2.0 3.5 2.2 -0.8 -8.1 -0.3 5.1 -4.4 2.0
2003/04 2.8 5.5 4.7 3.8 4.3 4.3 7.1 4.1 3.4 0.2 -2.4 5.7 -6.8 3.2
2004/05 2.3 0.4 -3.6 4.9 2.3 3.1 6.9 1.1 0.9 2.9 -2.6 2.7 5.1 -6.5
2005/06 1.9 5.5 1.4 4.2 3.2 3.3 4.2 3.5 1.1 5.7 4.7 1.5 5.0 -2.3
2006/07 5.0 10.1 2.6 6.3 1.7 4.1 2.1 3.4 0.1 4.0 3.7 0.8 -3.1 2.6
2007/08 4.6 17.1 8.0 5.1 2.9 3.9 2.6 5.8 1.6 11.7 3.9 4.7 -0.6 2.8
2008/09 2.3 11.1 6.4 2.5 2.7 3.6 0.2 3.3 4.6 9.7 1.1 -1.5 -0.9 4.0
2009/10 8.9 12.2 9.2 6.7 5.9 3.3 11.9 1.8 -0.9 -1.8 4.9 1.0 4.4 1.3
Actual Spending Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1999/00 0.7 -3.4 6.1 6.2 3.8 1.8 7.1 9.4 3.6 10.0 7.8 3.8
2000/01 6.0 6.4 10.7 0.2 -2.3 4.9 -0.5 2.8 2.6 9.5 1.1 6.0 4.1 10.7
2001/02 2.1 5.5 3.8 5.1 7.3 3.2 3.0 1.8 7.0 9.9 10.1 9.2 5.5 8.4
2002/03 4.0 5.9 2.3 1.5 4.2 3.7 4.1 3.1 0.6 -1.5 1.1 5.7 3.0 5.1
2003/04 3.5 5.1 12.6 6.6 3.9 3.6 7.8 7.1 6.2 5.9 1.1 5.8 9.0 7.1
2004/05 11.5 0.8 0.3 7.9 2.0 5.1 7.4 2.7 3.9 11.1 1.4 5.6 10.7 2.9
2005/06 -0.8 4.9 1.8 6.1 5.9 4.6 5.7 7.2 9.2 11.6 7.2 7.3 1.6 8.2
2006/07 6.2 5.0 3.3 4.6 5.3 5.8 4.9 5.3 7.4 9.1 4.8 4.3 6.7 5.6
2007/08 4.8 11.2 8.2 8.3 7.3 6.3 9.4 8.7 3.9 20.4 7.2 11.0 6.3 8.8
2008/09 2.6 13.8 7.9 4.8 6.3 4.4 0.4 4.3 20.4 8.3 3.5 5.0 5.7 11.9
Difference (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1999/00 0.6 -2.4 6.4 1.6 1.8 3.0 4.2 7.6 3.9 7.8 6.4 7.5
2000/01 5.3 3.3 9.2 0.8 0.0 2.1 0.7 3.4 -1.1 7.7 2.4 1.2 6.0 7.5
2001/02 -3.1 0.1 4.0 4.6 0.7 -0.2 0.8 0.1 1.2 -2.6 2.7 4.8 6.7 6.6
2002/03 0.7 4.4 1.0 0.6 -0.2 1.7 0.7 0.9 1.3 6.5 1.4 0.6 7.5 3.1
2003/04 0.7 -0.4 7.9 2.8 -0.4 -0.6 0.7 3.0 2.7 5.7 3.5 0.1 15.8 3.9
2004/05 9.2 0.4 3.9 3.0 -0.3 2.0 0.5 1.6 3.0 8.2 4.0 2.9 5.5 9.4
2005/06 -2.6 -0.6 0.4 2.0 2.7 1.2 1.5 3.7 8.1 5.9 2.4 5.8 -3.4 10.5
2006/07 1.2 -5.1 0.7 -1.7 3.6 1.7 2.8 2.0 7.2 5.1 1.1 3.5 9.8 3.0
2007/08 0.1 -5.9 0.3 3.2 4.5 2.4 6.8 2.9 2.3 8.7 3.4 6.3 6.9 6.0
2008/09 0.3 2.8 1.5 2.2 3.7 0.8 0.2 0.9 15.7 -1.4 2.4 6.5 6.6 8.0
Table 1. Budgeted and Actual Expenditures, 1999/00–2009/10
Note: The 2008/09 public account figures for Nunavut are from Finance Canada’s fiscal reference tables because at the time of preparation there were delays
in either tabling the consolidated figures or completing the audit.
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors’ calculations.Backgrounder 129 | 3
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4 The public accounts data for Quebec on which these measures are based differ slightly from those in earlier versions of these rankings: it is not
clear which set of public accounts figures an engaged but non-expert user would use in Quebec’s case, and we have adopted the first to appear in
the documents in this year’s edition. The change does not materially affect Quebec’s generally good position in these rankings. 
Table 1 documents budget promises versus end-
of-year results for each fiscal year since 1999/00,
showing year-over-year changes to spending as
projected in budgets and as reported in public
accounts documents, as well as the difference
between them. 
We summarize the 10-year record using two
measures: 
￿ Bias – the average difference between actual and
predicted results. This is the arithmetic mean of the
annual results, and captures the direction – over or
under – of actual versus budgeted results, weighing
each percent deviation over the period equally.
￿ Accuracy – the root average square of the
deviations. If over- and under-shoots cancel out, a
series of large misses will have the same bias score
as a series of small misses. The accuracy measure
weighs larger misses more heavily and sums them
without regard to sign, creating a useful summary
indicator of how good governments are at
meeting their targets, regardless of whether the
results are above or below the projections.
On these measures, New Brunswick and Quebec
have fulfilled their spending promises better than
other jurisdictions (Table 2).4 Nova Scotia’s accuracy
has been good, though a record of modest positive
overruns puts it mid-pack in terms of bias. In
contrast, Ottawa and Newfoundland and Labrador
do poorly on accuracy, but rank well on bias thanks
to a tendency for spending over- and under-runs to
cancel over time. Resource-dependent jurisdictions
do poorly: Saskatchewan’s record is unimpressive,
and Alberta – though ahead of Nunavut – has the
worst record of fulfilling spending promises among
the provinces. 
Tables 3 and 4 present analogous statistics on the
revenue side. The most eye-catching figures in Table 3
are the recent shortfalls in revenue in many jurisdictions,
most notably Ottawa, Nova Scotia, Ontario and
Alberta. A more subtle point is that the past decade saw
many years when revenues came in above targets.
This fact – and the likelihood that bottom-line
constraints will affect Canadian governments for
years to come – raises the question of how readily


















Change in Expenditure Forecast
Jurisdiction Bias (%) Rank Accuracy (%) Rank Total Overrun ($B)
Federal 1.2 2 3.6 8 21.7
Newfoundland -0.3 1 3.2 5 -0.2
Prince Edward Island 3.5 9 4.7 10 0.4
Nova Scotia 1.9 6 2.5 3 1.1
New Brunswick 1.6 4 2.4 2 1.0
Quebec 1.4 3 1.8 1 7.3
Ontario 1.9 5 2.8 4 14.5
Manitoba 2.6 7 3.3 7 1.1
Saskatchewan 4.4 11 6.4 11 3.4
Alberta 5.2 12 6.4 12 11.4
British Columbia 3.0 8 3.3 6 8.2
Northwest Territories1 3.5 10 4.0 9 0.3
Yukon 6.9 14 8.2 14 0.5
Nunavut1 6.4 13 6.6 13 0.5
Table 2. Bias and Accuracy in Budget Forecasts of Changes in Spending, 1999/00–2008/09
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents, fiscal reference tables (federal Department of Finance), authors’ calculations.
1 Starting in fiscal year 2000/01.| 4 Backgrounder 129
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Announced Revenue Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1999/00 0.1 -1.2 -2.9 1.6 1.9 -1.2 6.0 1.8 -0.5 1.6 -0.3 -7.4
2000/01 1.3 3.9 -1.7 0.2 -1.5 2.8 -0.7 1.3 9.8 -1.6 0.5 4.9 1.7 3.1
2001/02 -4.1 5.7 0.6 1.8 4.4 0.5 -1.0 0.6 -11.1 -10.7 2.3 1.6 0.9 5.5
2002/03 0.3 0.7 -0.4 3.1 1.2 2.0 4.9 0.6 2.3 -5.6 -3.6 -13.1 -2.4 -2.5
2003/04 3.4 1.8 4.6 3.8 4.4 4.3 7.8 4.6 -2.8 -2.9 4.1 10.3 1.1 10.4
2004/05 3.4 -3.8 3.1 4.2 4.6 3.1 14.8 4.0 1.8 -9.4 3.2 6.9 2.1 2.7
2005/06 2.3 3.5 3.1 4.4 2.8 3.3 5.9 -0.3 -9.2 -4.9 1.1 1.9 5.0 5.4
2006/07 2.8 0.0 3.1 5.1 0.1 4.4 2.1 3.4 -3.5 -6.3 -0.3 2.0 1.1 2.5
2007/08 1.9 15.8 8.0 5.8 2.8 1.2 2.6 5.8 -6.2 -4.7 -1.7 4.3 -3.3 2.9
2008/09 -1.1 -3.7 6.8 2.3 2.7 0.1 0.4 1.3 -0.3 2.2 -2.3 -4.5 1.0 4.5
2009/10 -4.9 -29.5 6.7 -1.0 -0.6 -0.4 2.7 -0.4 -12.4 -11.1 -1.9 3.4 5.3 5.6
Actual Revenue Change (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1999/00 6.7 -0.6 5.5 5.1 7.5 1.5 13.0 7.6 4.5 19.8 7.6 -5.6
2000/01 9.0 6.8 4.5 6.4 1.3 7.8 2.8 6.5 15.4 28.0 10.4 22.1 13.7 10.8
2001/02 -3.3 -1.3 4.2 1.0 7.7 -1.5 -1.2 -0.1 -10.2 -14.1 -5.5 10.5 -4.5 -5.2
2002/03 3.8 2.5 -2.8 1.0 -1.3 4.2 3.7 3.2 6.7 3.5 -3.3 -11.4 6.5 10.3
2003/04 4.7 2.9 5.3 7.2 4.1 4.3 -0.7 4.7 1.6 14.3 8.1 3.0 12.0 6.0
2004/05 7.2 2.1 9.5 9.4 9.4 4.5 13.8 11.5 19.1 13.6 14.2 13.1 12.0 10.1
2005/06 5.2 18.9 5.0 7.0 5.8 5.9 8.3 2.3 5.5 22.0 7.9 11.4 9.4 13.2
2006/07 6.2 -3.2 5.4 5.7 5.2 9.3 7.4 6.1 5.3 7.7 7.1 8.7 5.5 19.0
2007/08 2.8 30.2 5.9 12.2 5.0 5.6 7.5 9.4 14.4 0.0 3.5 12.9 2.1 -7.3
2008/09 -3.8 28.3 5.8 -0.6 2.1 -0.3 -6.9 3.4 26.2 -6.3 -3.7 -6.1 5.0 6.1
Difference (%)
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
1999/00 6.6 0.6 8.4 3.5 5.6 2.7 7.0 5.9 5.0 18.2 8.0 1.7
2000/01 7.7 2.9 6.2 6.2 2.8 5.0 3.5 5.3 5.6 29.6 9.8 17.2 12.1 7.7
2001/02 0.8 -7.1 3.6 -0.8 3.3 -1.9 -0.2 -0.7 0.8 -3.3 -7.8 8.9 -5.4 -10.7
2002/03 3.4 1.8 -2.4 -2.1 -2.5 2.2 -1.1 2.6 4.4 9.0 0.3 1.7 8.8 12.9
2003/04 1.3 1.1 0.7 3.4 -0.3 0.1 -8.5 0.1 4.3 17.2 4.0 -7.4 10.8 -4.4
2004/05 3.9 5.9 6.4 5.2 4.9 1.4 -1.0 7.5 17.3 23.0 11.0 6.3 9.9 7.4
2005/06 2.9 15.4 1.9 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.6 14.7 26.9 6.8 9.4 4.4 7.8
2006/07 3.4 -3.2 2.3 0.6 5.1 4.9 5.2 2.7 8.8 14.1 7.5 6.7 4.4 16.5
2007/08 0.9 14.4 -2.1 6.4 2.1 4.4 4.9 3.6 20.5 4.6 5.2 8.6 5.4 -10.3
2008/09 -2.7 32.1 -0.9 -2.9 -0.5 -0.4 -7.3 2.1 26.5 -8.5 -1.4 -1.5 4.0 1.6
Table 3. Budgeted and Actual Revenues, 1999/00–2008/09
Note: The 2008/09 public account figures for Nunavut are from Finance Canada’s fiscal reference tables because at the time of preparation there were delays
in either tabling the consolidated figures or completing the audit.
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in response to revenues exceeding or falling short of
projections. Table 5 looks at the correlations
between in-year revenue and spending surprises over
the decade. Alberta, Saskatchewan, Quebec and
Ontario show some correlation between surprise
revenues and expenses. These correlations raise more
concern when the surprises are strongly tilted in one
direction and large. We note, therefore, that
Alberta’s and Saskatchewan’s 2008/09 spending
surprises – an under-shoot in Alberta’s case and an
over-shoot in Saskatchewan’s – continue a record of
in-year reactions that undercut the significance of
budget plans in both provinces.
Five-year Accountability Measures: Are
Governments Getting Better or Worse over Time? 
Since this is the fourth year of these accountability
rankings, it would be welcome if we could report
that systematic scrutiny of government’s success or
failure in hitting budget targets induces improve-
ment over time. With the most recent fiscal year
being a particularly bad one, however, our rough-
and-ready investigation of this question – splitting
the decade and comparing the most recent and prior
five-year periods – gives little encouragement. 
In terms of spending, average performance across
the country deteriorated somewhat. New Brunswick
and Saskatchewan show marked deteriorations in
both bias and accuracy. In contrast, Manitoba and
Prince Edward Island appear to be heading in the
right direction, where spending promised is likelier
to be delivered (Table 6).
On the revenue side, average performance
deteriorated more – not surprisingly, with 2008/09
affecting the accuracy measures in the latter five-year
period. Harder to excuse is the general worsening in
the bias measure in the more recent period: sympto-
matic of worsening underprediction of revenues.
In both cases, the variation in performance across
the country and often between economically similar
provinces warns against simple explanations based on
circumstances. Accidents are a part of life, but some
jurisdictions appear more accident-prone than others.
Reporting Practices and Fiscal Accountability 
In some jurisdictions, legislators, committees, and
voters who are motivated to hold governments to
their fiscal promises benefit from budgets and timely
public accounts that are clear, use similar account-
ing, and provide detailed analysis of variances from
Change in Revenue Forecast
Jurisdiction Bias (%) Rank Accuracy (%) Rank Total Overrun ($B)
Federal 2.8 6 4.0 5 48.0
Newfoundland 6.4 12 12.6 12 3.5
Prince Edward Island 2.4 5 4.3 6 0.2
Nova Scotia 2.2 3 3.9 3 1.2
New Brunswick 2.3 4 3.5 2 1.3
Quebec 2.1 2 3.1 1 11.0
Ontario 0.5 1 5.0 7 2.4
Manitoba 3.2 7 4.0 4 2.5
Saskatchewan 10.8 13 13.5 13 8.4
Alberta 13.1 14 17.7 14 30.7
British Columbia 4.3 9 7.0 8 12.4
Northwest Territories1 5.5 10 8.2 10 0.5
Yukon 5.6 11 7.4 9 0.4
Nunavut1 3.2 8 9.2 11 0.3
Table 4. Bias and Accuracy in Budget Forecasts of Changes in Revenue, 1999/00–2008/09
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents, fiscal reference tables (federal Department of Finance), authors’ calculations.
1 Starting in fiscal year 2000/01.| 6 Backgrounder 129
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Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut
Correlation 
of surprises 0.43 0.14 0.62 0.13 0.17 0.75 0.66 0.45 0.68 0.74 0.29 0.20 0.21 -0.10
Rank 8 3 10 2 4 14 11 9 12 13 7 5 6 1
Expenditures
National
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut Average
Bias: 
First 5 years 0.9 1.0 5.7 2.1 0.4 0.0 1.4 3.0 1.6 5.0 3.3 1.7 8.7 5.3 2.9
Last 5 years 1.6 -1.7 1.3 1.7 2.8 0.3 2.4 2.2 7.3 5.3 2.6 5.0 5.1 7.4 3.1
Difference 0.8 -2.7 -4.3 -0.3 2.4 0.3 1.0 -0.8 5.7 0.3 -0.6 3.3 -3.6 2.1 0.3
Accuracy:
First 5 years 2.8 2.7 6.4 2.6 0.9 2.3 2.0 4.0 2.3 6.4 3.7 2.2 9.4 5.0 3.8
Last 5 years 4.3 3.7 1.9 2.5 3.3 1.3 3.4 2.4 8.7 6.4 2.8 5.2 6.8 7.8 4.3
Difference 1.5 1.0 -4.5 -0.1 2.4 -1.0 1.4 -1.5 6.4 0.1 -0.9 3.0 -2.6 2.9 0.6
Revenues
National
Federal NL PEI NS NB QC ON MB SK AB BC NWT YK Nunavut Average
Bias: 
First 5 years 4.0 -0.1 3.3 2.0 1.8 0.3 0.1 2.6 4.0 14.1 2.9 5.1 5.6 1.4 3.4
Last 5 years 1.7 12.9 1.5 2.4 2.9 1.8 0.9 3.7 17.6 12.0 5.8 5.9 5.6 4.6 5.7
Difference -2.3 13.0 -1.8 0.3 1.1 1.6 0.7 1.1 13.5 -2.1 2.9 0.8 0.0 3.2 2.3
Accuracy: 
First 5 years 4.8 3.5 5.0 3.7 3.3 3.1 5.2 3.7 4.4 17.9 6.9 9.3 8.6 8.5 6.3
Last 5 years 2.9 17.4 3.3 4.1 3.5 2.5 4.7 4.2 18.5 17.6 7.1 7.1 6.0 10.0 7.8
Difference -1.9 13.9 -1.7 0.4 0.2 -0.6 -0.5 0.5 14.1 -0.3 0.2 -2.2 -2.6 1.5 1.5
Table 5. Correlation of Surprises, 1999/00–2008/09
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors’ calculations.
Note: The short, 10-year period of observations makes the statistically significant level of correlation about 0.55 with a two tailed 10 percent significance test.
Sources: Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents; public accounts; authors’ calculations.
Table 6. Improvements and Deteriorations in Accountability, 1999/00–2003/04 vs 2004/05–2008/09
(percentage points)Backgrounder 129 | 7
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Table 7. Evaluating the Reporting Practices of Public Accounts Documents in Canada, 2008/09
Notes: Analysis for Nunavut is based on the 2007/08 public accounts. Most regions’ public accounts were published within six weeks of audit approval.
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Federal Yes, budget figures
match. A
Public Accounts use multiple tables
and figures, supported by text, at the
beginning of document.









No use of reconciliation tables or
explanations, figures do not appear in
main documents.
F 0 (0) – No major reservations. Oct. 15
2009
PEI  Revised estimates appear
in public accounts. D
No use of reconciliation tables or
explanations, results appear early on
in document.




estimates match but appear
later in public accounts.
B
Variance tables given, with explanation of
deviations from budget, but comes later
in document.
A
1 (0) – Last reservation, in 1999/00, was
about a late report from a Crown
Corporation regarding its pension liabilities.
July 15
2009
NB Yes, budget figures
match. A
Multiple variance tables and figures,
supported by text, at the beginning of
document. 





Volume II of Public
Accounts.
F
Multiple variance tables and graphics,
supported by text, but for different
budget figures, at the beginning of
Volume I in the public accounts. 
C
20 (0) – Reservations from 2001/02 to 2005/06
concerned the exclusion of broader public sector
in education and health from results, improper




ON Yes, budget figures
match. A
Multiple variance tables, supported
by text, at the beginning of
document.
A 0 (0) – No major reservations. July 31
2009
MB Yes, budget figures
match. A
Variance tables, some explanation of
deviations from budget, but comes
later in document. 
B
3 (0) – Most recent reservation in 
2006/07 concerned the exclusion of public 




SK Yes, budget figures
match. A
Limited use of reconciliation tables,
detailed explanation for variation, results
appear at beginning of document. 
B
24 (2) – Ongoing objections to recording
transaction with Fiscal Stabilization Fund 




AB Yes, budget figures
match. A No use of reconciliation tables or explana-
tions, results appear early in document.  C 0 (0) – No major reservations. June 24
2009
BC Yes, budget figures
match. A
Variance analysis and reconciliation
tables, limited explanation, results
appear early in document.
B
11(4) – Auditor cautioned from 1999/00 
to 2003/04 about need to include broader
public sector – schools, universities and




Budget estimates do not
match. Comparable




Some use of reconciliation figures
with explanations, results appear early
in document.
B
3 (0) – Clean record since 2000/01, when
interim expenditures were made without
submitting a proper appropriation (without
tabling an associated bill).
Dec. 7
2009
YK Budget figures do not
match. F
Some reconciliation with budget, a
limited explanation of variations, located
early on in document.
D
4 (1) – Most recent reservation highlighted 
a violation of Financial Administration 
Act through the purchase of non-bank 
asset-back commercial paper.
N/A
Nunavut Budget figures do not
match. F Only previous years’ public accounts
figures are presented. F
11 (2) – The Government of Nunavut has
never tabled its consolidated financial accounts
on time. 2007/08 reservations, like the year
prior, are concerned with the Nunavut Business
Credit Corp.’s improper books of accounts. 
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budget plans. Elsewhere, presentations are incon-
sistent, obscure and slow. To grade governments on
this scale, we ask the following questions:
￿ Are the spending and revenue figures
prominently displayed in budget documents
and public accounts easily reconcilable?
￿ Do the public accounts clearly show deviations from
budget figures and explain the reasons for them?
￿ Does the relevant auditor express any concerns
about the public accounts figures? 
￿ How soon after the end of the fiscal year did the
public accounts appear?
Overall, Ontario and Ottawa, which present
comparable numbers and show how and why figures
changed over the course of the fiscal year, are setting the
reporting standard. Happily, and marking an
improvement from the past, most governments’ public
accounts reports are reconcilable with figures from the
budget documents – the main exceptions being
Quebec, Newfoundland and Labrador, and the
territories, where budgetary presentations (as used to be
common across the country) are on a different
accounting basis. Still, too few jurisdictions clearly show
the magnitude of changes from budget projections to
actual results, or explain why they occurred. 
As to auditor reservations, most jurisdictions have
reasonably good records, though Saskatchewan’s and
British Columbia’s auditors have some continuing
concerns (Table 7). Quebec’s and Saskatchewan’s
histories show a high number of reservations: it is
reasonable to worry that financial reporting that had
better satisfied their respective auditors might have
shown these provinces in a poorer light. 
Finally, we note a remarkable spread in the
timeliness of the reports. British Columbia, Alberta
and Saskatchewan led the pack in 2008/09, with
public accounts that passed the audit stage before
the first quarter of the next fiscal year was over.
Conspicuously poor in this regard were the
territories, which tended to produce their public
accounts so late that legislators and voters did not
have this critical information until close to the end
of the next fiscal year.5
Concluding Comments
In this, our fourth survey of a decade’s fiscal results
across Canada’s senior governments, one main
message has not changed: spending overruns are a
common occurrence. The post-crisis explosion of
government borrowing makes past over-runs all the
more regrettable: if governments had stuck to their
budget targets – and resisted the common tendency
to spend revenue windfalls – the fiscal capacity to
respond to the downturn would have been greater
and the road back to balance shorter.
Massive emergency and stimulus spending in
2009 and 2010 – and the immediate loss of budget
balance as a benchmark of prudence – threatens to
further undermine scrutiny of in-year spending
decisions. One potential route to more effective
review is a stronger role for public accounts
committees. Historically, these parliamentary
committees have played a key oversight role in most
“Westminster models” of democracy, scrutinizing
public accounts documents and governments’
financial management, and reviewing the reports of
the relevant auditor to examine if proposed policies
are carried out in an efficient manner. The relative
importance of public accounts committees has
diminished over time (Malloy 2004); while these
committees have limited scope to tackle the policy
reasons for in-year spending changes, regular reports
from them that explored in-year deviations from
plans would provide valuable parliamentary
oversight of governmental decisions.6
Past over-runs have left Canadian governments
more vulnerable to the budgetary impacts of the
slump than they otherwise would have been. We
can learn from past mistakes, however: more careful
revenue projections, tighter spending scrutiny, better
oversight, and financial reporting that is clear and
timely can all help restore fiscal balance and prepare
a future of lower debt and taxes.
5 The territorial public accounts are audited by the Auditor General of Canada, but the lateness of their financial statements appears to result, not
from any slowness in the office of the Auditor General, but from late submission of key documents, particularly with regard to crown corporations.
6 At each level of government, other committees may have wider mandates to tackle financial scrutiny. In Ottawa, for example, the Government
Operations and Estimates Committee has a mandate for scrutiny that may be better able to perform the type of role advocated here. Backgrounder 129 | 9
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